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In  this  paper,  we  ask  how  antitrust  immunity  subject  to  a  carve-out  affects  collusion 
incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density 
due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the 
interhub segment, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect 
from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demands and 
linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion 
are no different before and after the emergence of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out. 
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September 21, 2011 1 Introduction
Airline alliances that have received antitrust immunity from regulatory authorities gain full license
to cooperate in setting fares. The theoretical literature on immunized alliances has shown that
such cooperation can have both positive and negative e⁄ects.1 On the one hand, cooperation
in fare setting confers bene￿ts on ￿interline￿passengers, who must travel across the networks of
both alliance partners to make their trips. Since an interline trip is a joint product provided by
two carriers, the fare is lower when it is set cooperatively than when it is determined by ￿arm￿ s
length￿interaction between the carriers. Cooperation eliminates double marginalization, reducing
the interline fare.
However, alliances a⁄ect a separate group of passengers, those starting and ending their trips at
the hub airports of the alliance partners. In the case of transatlantic travel, one hub would be in the
US and the other in the EU, so that the interhub market might be New York-London. In contrast
to an interline passenger, whose typical trip between smaller interior US and EU cities cannot be
carried out on a single carrier, passengers in a hub-to-hub market can make their trip using one
alliance partner or the other, given that both ￿ y between the hubs. With such overlapping service,
cooperation in fare setting may lead to anticompetitive collusion, with the result that fares in the
interhub market rise. Thus, interhub passengers may be harmed by cooperative pricing.
One remedy for this potential downside to immunized alliances is known as a ￿carve-out.￿
Under a carve-out, the alliance partners are allowed to cooperate in setting fares in the interline
markets, but are prohibited from discussing interhub fares. The expectation is that a carve-out will
prevent loss of competition in the interhub market while still reaping the bene￿ts of cooperation
for other passengers. See Brueckner and Proost (2010) for an analysis of carve-outs.
A carve-out is thus expected to maintain the pre-alliance competitive situation in the interhub
market, laying to rest anticompetitive concerns regarding this market. However, a factor overlooked
in the previous analyses of airline alliances suggests that this conclusion may be premature. The
di¢ culty is that prior work has ignored the possibility of tacit collusion on routes like the interhub
market where carriers provide overlapping service. Any appraisal of the competitive state of such a
market should include some gauge of the sustainability of collusion in the market. If tacit collusion
is sustainable under a wide range of conditions, with competitors having little incentive to defect
from a collusive arrangement, then expectations for a competitive outcome are reduced.
The rationale justifying a carve-out assumes that it preserves the nominal competitive state of
the interhub market. However, the prealliance competitive situation might not be preserved if the
1See Brueckner (2001, 2003) and Brueckner and Whalen (2000). A large additional literature on alliances exists.
See Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004), Bilotkach (2005), Chen and Gayle (2007), Flores-Fillol and Moner-
Colonques (2007), Gayle (2007, 2008), Hassin and Shy (2004), Park (1997), Park, Park and Zhang (2003), Park and
Zhang (1998), Park, Zhang and Zhang (2001), and Whalen (2007).
2existence of the alliance increases the sustainability of collusion in that market. Instead, the alliance
could strenghten the incentive for tacit collusion so that the interhub market could become less
competitive despite the imposition of a carve-out. The alliance could exert such an e⁄ect through
its impact on interline passengers, who make more trips in response to a cooperative reduction in
the interline fare. This larger interline tra¢ c volume raises tra¢ c density on the interhub route,
reducing the marginal cost of carrying a passenger on this route. The crucial observation is that
this cost reduction could a⁄ect the incentives for collusion by the alliance partners in the interhub
market, strengtening them relative to the prealliance situation.
Using the standard approach to analyzing deviations from collusive behavior, the analysis
explores the e⁄ect of interline cooperation on the incentives for interhub collusion. These incentives
are measured by the critical value of the discount factor beyond which collusion is sustainable.
We show that, as the alliance boosts interline passenger tra¢ c, the resulting cost reduction from
economies of density on the interhub segment raises the incentive to collude in the interhub market,
validating the previous concern. However, the density-generated interhub cost reduction leads to
an expansion of tra¢ c in the interhub market itself, which raises the revenue gain from defection
in this market relative to the losses incurred during the retaliation period. Hence, an increase in
interline tra¢ c leads to an ambiguous net e⁄ect on collusion incentives. However, these two e⁄ects
exactly cancel under functional forms that are widely used in theoretical work on airlines: linear
demand and linear, decreasing marginal cost (corresponding to a quadratic cost function). As a
result, the incentives for collusion in the interhub market are no di⁄erent between the pre-alliance
situation and an alliance subject to a carve-out.
Viewing the linear speci￿cation as a reasonable approximation to more general functional forms,
our result provides encouraging news for airline regulators. In particular, regulators can be con￿-
dent that a carve-out, which maintains the nominal state of competition in the interhub market,
does not worsen actual competitive conditions by increasing the incentive for collusion in that
market. The analysis in remainder of the paper establishes this result.
2 Model
In the spirit of Brueckner and Proost (2010), we assume two national airlines A and B belonging
respectively to countries A and B. Each airline operates a hub in its own country, which also
serves as an international gateway. Airline A￿ s hub is denoted h and B￿ s hub is denoted j, and
both airlines provide service on the interhub route between h and j. The airlines also provide
exclusive service to interior cities in their home countries, a and b respectively. Airline A provides
service between a and its hub h, while airline B provides service between b and j. For simplicity,
we follow Brueckner and Proost (2010) by assuming that passenger demands exist only for round-
trip air travel between the cities a and b and between the hubs h and j. Airlines carry passengers
3between the hubs on direct ￿ ights, whereas they carry passengers between a and b using connections
at the two hubs h and j, trips that require use of both airlines.
We denote the trip demand originating from the city h for a return journey to city j by Dh(ph),
while the opposite trip demand is Dj(pj). The trip demand originating in city a for a return
journey to b is given by Da(pa), while the opposite trip demand is Db(pb). For simplicity we
assume that Da(p) = Db(p). Airlines incur symmetric costs that depend on the distance and
number of passengers carried on a route segment. For simplicity, we assume that distances are
identical for the ah; hj and jb routes. Costs are characterized by economies of density as larger
passenger ￿ ows imply larger aircraft seat capacities and smaller average costs per passenger. As a
result, a carrier￿ s cost for Q return trips on each segment is given by C(Q), where C0 > 0 ￿ C00.
In the interhub market between h and j, we assume that airlines compete by setting their
seat capacities Qh and Qj. The aggregate demand for travel between h and j is given by D(p) =
Dh(p) + Dj(p) and the inverse demand by P(Q). The ￿rms therefore play a Cournot capacity
game, where the market clears at the price P(Qh + Qj):
In the interline market between a and b, the airline A has monopoly power over the passengers
originating from city a, supplies the two trip legs from a to h and from h to j, but needs a third
leg from j and b using a seat on airline B to complete the trip. Let sa be the seat (access) price
paid to airline B, so that airline A gets revenue per passenger of only pa ￿ sa. The symmetric
situation applies for airline B. As in Brueckner and Proost (2010), we assume that passengers
￿ owing between a and b are equally split on the hj segment between airlines A and B. So, the
total number of passengers ￿ ying from h to j on airline A is equal to Qh + 1
2 [Da(pa) + Db(pb)].
The ￿rms simultaneously set their seat capacities (Qh;Qj) at the same time as they set their
trip and access prices (pa,sb) and (pb,sa), which determine their seat capacities on the ah and jb
segments. The pro￿t of airline A is given by







+ (pa ￿ sa)Da(pa) + sbDb(pb) ￿ C [Da(pa) + Db(pb)]
A symmetric expression holds for airline B.
Finally, we assume that airlines interact in an in￿nitely repeated game where they set their
prices and capacities in each period. There is no commitment between time periods. Airlines A
















where the subscript t denotes the pro￿t in time period t.
43 Airline alliance structure and collusion
Our focus is on the sustainability of collusion in the hub city-pair market hj. In the analysis, we do
not explicitly consider the determination of prices (pa;pb;sa;sb) in the interline market ab. Given
symmetry of the model, we assume that symmetric prices p ￿ pa = pb and s ￿ sa = sb emerge
in equilibrium. Moreover, we assume that p is lower when the carriers cooperate in setting the
interline fare than when (pa;pb;sa;sb) are chosen in noncooperative fashion. While Brueckner and
Proost (2010) and earlier papers show that this outcome is not guaranteed in general, it emerges
for most parameter values in numerical examples. The case of an alliance subject to a carve-out,
where cooperation in the ab market occurs, thus corresponds to a low value of p, with p being
higher in the pre-alliance case, where cooperation is absent.
For the sake of conciseness, let DA ￿ [Da(p) + Db(p)]=2 be the demand by ab passengers using
airline A and let vA ￿ (pa ￿ sa)Da(pa) + sbDb(pb) ￿ C [Da(pa) + Db(pb)], which equals ab revenue
minus the cost of operating the ah segment and is independent of the tra¢ c between h and j. The
pro￿t of airline A is then given by
￿A = P(Qh + Qj)Qh ￿ C (Qh + DA) + vA
In this Cournot-Nash game, each ￿rm maximizes its individual pro￿t taking the other airline￿ s
















h + DA) = 0; (1)
while airline B￿ s choice is determined by a symmetric condition. Because of cost symmetry, these
conditions yield the competitive seat capacities Q￿
h = Q￿





￿ ￿ C (Q
￿ + DA) + vA
and airline B￿ s by the symmetric expression. Coordination in the interline market a⁄ects the price
p and therefore pro￿t ￿￿
























A = dDA=dp < 0 and v0



















Hence, a fall in p induces an increase in interline tra¢ c and in pro￿ts in the interline market (￿rst
two terms). It also generates economies of density that allow airlines to reduce their interhub fares
and to earn a positive markup on additional passengers (last term).
5When ￿rms collude, they jointly set the seat capacity Qh + Qj so as to maximize their joint

















h + DA) (3)
The symmetric condition holds for Qj. Because of symmetry, we have that Qo
h = Qo
j ￿ Qo. It is





o ￿ C (Q
o + DA) + vA
and can be shown to be larger than ￿￿
A. Coordination in the interline segment a⁄ects the pro￿t
￿o






















However, by (3), the last term vanishes. Changes in interline tra¢ c bring no ￿rst-order changes
in the pro￿ts of the interhub segment because the cooperating airlines have set the seat capacities











Since interhub tra¢ c has already been optimized, a fall in p only a⁄ects pro￿t in the interline
market itself. So, despite the existence of economies density, cooperation in the interline market
therefore brings no gains in the interhub market.
When airline A deviates from the collusive outcome, it chooses its seat capacity Qd
h ￿ Qd to

























which can be shown to be higher than ￿o



























As in the case of the Nash equilibrium, a fall in the interline fare p increases interline tra¢ c and
brings additional tra¢ c and pro￿t to the interhub segment (second term).
6Collusion incentives are determined as follows. We assume that a deviation is followed by a
reversion to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium forever. This assumption can be relaxed with little
e⁄ect on the analysis. Collusion is then sustainable if and only if the long-run gain from collusion















An analogous condition applies for any other time period and for airline B. The above inequality
implies that collusion is sustainable if and only if







where the numerator is the deviation gain and the denominator is punishment cost.
We are now in a position to discuss how the fare p for interline trips between a and b a⁄ects
airline collusion in the interhub market hj. Lower fares increase the demand DA and augment
airline pro￿ts under collusion, deviation and competition provided that the price p lies above the
sum of marginal costs on the three route segments, which we assume in the sequel. Collusion is
more easily sustained if the deviation gain ￿d ￿ ￿o decreases faster than punishment cost ￿d ￿ ￿o
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￿ C0 (Q￿ + DA)
+
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P(Qd + Qo) ￿ C0 ￿
Qd + DA
￿￿ dQo






Aj = ￿dDA=dp > 0.
It is instructive to ￿rst discuss the case where economies of density are absent, with C0 equal
to a constant c. In this case, the tra¢ c DA does not appear in the above ￿rst-order conditions (1)
7to (5), so that seat capacity decisions (Qo;Q￿;Qd) in the hj market are una⁄ected by passenger
tra¢ c DA between a and b. Therefore, the pro￿ts under collusion, deviation and competition are
each increased by the same exogenous pro￿t that is earned from interline passengers. For airline
A, this pro￿t is equal to net revenue from interline passengers, (pa ￿ sa)Da(pa) + sbDb(pb), minus
the cost of carrying them from/to the airport a, c[Da(pa) + Db(pb)], and the cost of carrying them
between hubs h and j, c[Da(pa) + Db(pb)]=2. This pro￿t is actually equal to vA ￿ cDA. As a
result, a larger demand DA increases the pro￿ts ￿o, ￿￿ and ￿d by the same amount and therefore
does not change the pro￿t di⁄erences ￿o ￿ ￿￿ and ￿d ￿ ￿￿ in expressions (8) and (9). So, without
economies of density, the fare level in the interline market ab has no impact on collusion incentives
in market hj.
The impact of p on collusion therefore stems from the economies of density generated by the
resulting change in ab tra¢ c on the hj segment. Accordingly, suppose now that C00 < 0. The
impact of ab tra¢ c then includes a direct and an indirect e⁄ect. The direct e⁄ect is presented
in the ￿rst lines of the bracketed terms in expressions (8) and (9) and stems from economies of
density, as higher tra¢ c between a and b reduces marginal costs on the hj segment. Because















￿ + DA) < 0
So, with economies of density, an increase in DA tends to decrease the deviation gain more than
the punishment cost. Therefore, from a cost perspective, collusion is more likely to be sustained
with an increase in ab tra¢ c.
The indirect e⁄ect stems from the revenue e⁄ects of an increase in tra¢ c DA and is presented
in the second lines of the bracketed terms in expressions (8) and (9). This e⁄ect results from the
price decline in the interhub market hj that follows from the drop in marginal costs due to the
density e⁄ect. The price decline emerges because the lower marginal costs on the interhub segment


























Therefore, referring to (5) and (6), the indirect e⁄ect of the additional ab tra¢ c increases the
deviation gain by more than the punishment cost. So from a revenue perspective, collusion is less
likely to be sustained with additional ab tra¢ c. Hence, an increase in ab tra¢ c leads to direct and
indirect e⁄ects on deviation gains and punishment costs that have opposite signs, making the net
e⁄ect on collusion incentives ambiguous. These e⁄ects, however, exactly cancel under functional
forms that are widely used in theoretical models of the airline industry and are likely to represent
a close approximation to actual demand and cost functions.
8In particular, suppose that demands are linear and symmetric between markets and that cost is
quadratic. Normalizing the units of output and specifying the numeraire, we can assume P = 1￿Q














2(1 ￿ d)(2 ￿ d)
(1 ￿ c + dDA)





8(1 ￿ d)(2 ￿ d)





17 ￿ 24d + 8d2
8(1 ￿ d)(3 ￿ 2d)
2 (2 ￿ d)
2 (1 ￿ c + dDA)
2
The pro￿t di⁄erentials thus have the common factor (1 ￿ c + dDA)
2. As a result, critical value ￿
of the discount factor, above which collusion is sustainable, is invariant to tra¢ c in the ab market.




17 ￿ 8(3 ￿ d)d
which increases in d. This result generalizes to a setup where demand is linear but asymmetric
across markets, although it does not generalize to the case of quadratic costs that are asymmetric
across route segments. We summarize the above results as follows:
Proposition 1 The incentives for collusion in the hj market are independent of the level of tra¢ c
ab market and thus independent of the price p in that market (i) under linear costs and (ii) under
linear demand and symmetric quadratic costs.
Thus, the nature of pricing in the ab market has no impact on the incentives for collusion on
the interhub hj market. The reason is the resulting change in ab tra¢ c has e⁄ects on costs and
revenues in the hj market that e⁄ectively balance out.
4 Conclusion
Proposition 1 provides welcome news for airline regulators. Its implication is that the incentives
for collusion in an alliance￿ s interhub market under a carve-out are the same as in the prealliance
situation, where the ab price is higher. Thus, the carve-out￿ s nominal preservation of competition
in the interhub market is not undermined by a worsening of actual competitive conditions, as
measured by the incentives for collusion. If regulators believe that a carve-out is worth imposing,
their decision will not be undone by a greater incentive for tacit collusion between the alliance
partners.
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